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tends to focus on species “biodiversity” rather than individuals. Individuals of the same species get
categorized as “wild” or “captive”, with the latter often omitted from conservationists’ concerns.
But wild and captive animals, although they may require different treatment, have comparable
interests as individuals. Equity requires taking this into account in conservation efforts.
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Ecological problems are social and moral as well as scientific and technological. They result from
human interactions with the natural environment that have negative effects on humans,
nonhuman animals, and ecological systems (Attfield, 2014).
In philosophical approaches to environmental problems, there are tensions among
normative stances (Callicott, 1998) advocating different policies and practices for environmental
and animal welfare concerns. Ecocentrists advocate preserving ecosystems, species, habitats, and
biodiversity (Warren et al., 2018; Xu et al., 2009; Colwell et al., 2008) but ignore the problems of
animal suffering and welfare stressed by animal liberationists like Singer (1995, on a utilitarian
basis) and Regan (1976, on a rights basis). Ecological research tends to focus on species loss and
dwindling refuges, not the individual animals (Humphreys, 2020), whose interests only count if
they are members of a species under threat. This is the case in Thailand for elephants: as if there
were an ontological distinction between wild elephants (an endangered species, hence protected
to a certain extent), and domesticated or captive elephants (not considered “wild” and thus not
afforded the same level of protection).
Taking animals’ interests seriously obliges us to be concerned about the individual welfare
of both domestic and wild nonhuman animals. In the case of wild elephants and their
“domesticated” counterparts, it would behoove us to recognize individuals in both categories as
individuals with the same biological imperatives — imperatives grossly undermined by various
forms of captivity (Humphreys, 2016).
Ecocentrists hold that normative approaches concerned primarily with the good of
individuals (such as biocentrism and sentientism) neglect the good of species and ecosystems
(Rolston, 1998). This focus on species may be what has led conservationists to avoid rehabilitating
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and rewilding of animals, as Baker & Winkler (2020) (B&W) explain in their target articles, citing
Aitken (2004). A species is a general term for an interbreeding population of individuals with
common traits — individuals who have intrinsic value irrespective of the value they contribute to
the ecosystem of which they are a part. Sentientists and biocentrists hold that it is individuals,
rather than species, that have intrinsic value.
Taylor (2011) (a biocentrist) argues for the moral standing of all living creatures, and for
their equal worth. This form of biocentrism, however, does not allow us to take into account
differences between species, or between individuals of the same species. Such differences could
indicate differences in moral significance when interests conflict. Other forms of biocentrism
recognize that in practice, equality does not mean equal treatment. For example, the life of a
plant has less value than the life of an elephant. Singer argues that we should apply the principle
of equal consideration to all animals capable of suffering, nonhuman as well as human; failure to
do so amounts to unfair discrimination or speciesism.
The principle would apply to both wild and captive elephants so their interests would
deserve equal consideration. Such interests include exercising their biological dispositions and
their complex cognitive abilities, foraging over diverse and vast areas, as well as forming social
groups and having families (Holdrege, 2003). These interests are significantly more restricted in
captive elephants (Snijders, 2020). In the case of wild elephants, much more effort is needed to
protect their dwindling habitats.
Applying the principle to captive elephants would certainly involve rehabilitating and
returning to a wild or at least a semi-wild environment, but also recognising the human interests
that stand to be affected. Ecological problems are partly social problems; some human and animal
interests are intertwined today to the point of codependency. This is the case with elephants (wild
and captive) in Thailand (Pauketat, 2020). There are also significant conflicts of interests
(Blumstein and Lynch, 2020). But proposals to rewild elephants by working in collaboration with
relevant human groups, including Karen communities, present plausible and innovative solutions
for elephant conservation efforts in Thailand. In our era of environmental crisis, the interests of
humans and elephants cannot be met if they are pitted against one another. A codependency
needs to be recognized. Rehabilitation and rewilding practices can take this into account, enabling
elephants to live a life natural for their own kind and enabling human communities to flourish in
the process.
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Special Issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies
Plant Sentience: Theoretical and Empirical Issues
Guest Editors: Vicente Raja (Rotman Institute of Philosophy, Western University)
Miguel Segundo-Ortin (School of Liberal Arts, University of Wollongong)
In this special issue, we address the issue of plant sentience/consciousness from different
disciplines that combine both theoretical and empirical perspectives. Some of the questions
to be addressed in the special issue include the following:
•

Plants exhibit interesting behaviors; does this entail that they are conscious to some
extent?

•

What are the requirements for a living organism to be conscious? Do plants meet these
requirements?

•

What does the possibility of plant sentience/consciousness entail for the study of the
evolution of consciousness?

•

Is it just a categorical mistake to attribute consciousness to plants?

•

Can we talk about different levels or degrees of consciousness?
How to submit?
Deadline: June 1st, 2020

Please submit your papers (max. 9000 words including footnotes, references, abstract, etc.) to
vgalian@uwo.ca with subject “Paper Special Issue JCS”.
For more information, including bibliography and more detailed descriptions of the topics
and questions to be addressed in the papers submitted to the special issue, please contact the
guest editors at vgalian@uwo.ca (Vicente) or mso693@uowmail.edu.au (Miguel).

